Analyst(s): Alex Smith
Publication Date: February 18, 2026
Xerox announces a redesigned global print go-to-market structure that consolidates Xerox-Lexmark sales operations, shifts SMB coverage to partners, and reorganizes regional operations to improve efficiency and compete for growth in a challenging print market.
What is Covered in This Article:
- Xerox’s restructured print sales model, integrating Xerox and Lexmark operations
- The shift of SMB hardware fulfillment and coverage to channel partners
- Regional segmentation into North America, Western Europe, and Rest of World models
- The profitability-focused approach for lower-priority international geographies
- Whether sales reorganization can reverse share loss without product differentiation
The News: Xerox announced on February 16, 2026, a redesigned global print go-to-market structure that consolidates its Xerox and Lexmark sales operations and reorganizes regional coverage models. The new structure, which will take effect in the second quarter of 2026, aims to eliminate sales redundancies, improve operational efficiency, and position the company to reclaim market share across print, IT solutions, digital services, and graphic communications. The restructured framework organizes global operations into three regional models: North America, Western Europe, and Rest of World. In North America and Western Europe, direct sales will focus on enterprise and corporate clients, while partners will assume expanded responsibilities for hardware fulfillment and small and medium-sized business (SMB) coverage supported by inside sales. The Rest of World segment is divided into a dedicated Asia Pacific organization focused on growth and share-gain initiatives, and an International Operations unit covering remaining geographies under a cost-efficient hybrid model designed to protect profitability.
Xerox Restructures Global Sales to Drive Print Through Partner Expansion
Analyst Take: Xerox’s announcement signals a defensive repositioning in a print hardware market that continues to shrink under pressure from digital transformation and a secular decline in office printing volumes. The integration of Xerox and Lexmark sales operations addresses post-acquisition redundancy, but the real strategic shift lies in offloading SMB hardware fulfillment to partners while concentrating direct sales resources on higher-value enterprise and corporate accounts. This segmentation model prioritizes profitability over breadth of coverage, reflecting the company’s recognition that maintaining a direct sales infrastructure for lower-margin SMB deals is no longer economically viable. The reorganization also introduces geographic tiering, with Asia Pacific receiving growth investment while other international markets operate under cost-containment frameworks. Whether this restructuring can reverse market share erosion depends less on sales efficiency gains and more on whether Xerox can deliver differentiated product value in print hardware, IT solutions, and graphic communications segments where competitors have established strong positions.
Post-Acquisition Integration as Operational Necessity
The unification of Xerox and Lexmark sales operations addresses a structural inefficiency created by Xerox’s acquisition of certain Lexmark assets, resulting in overlapping sales teams, duplicated account coverage, and conflicting partner relationships. By consolidating these operations under a single go-to-market framework, Xerox eliminates redundant roles, simplifies partner engagement, and reduces internal friction that has likely slowed deal velocity and created customer confusion. This integration is particularly critical in enterprise accounts where both Xerox and Lexmark had existing relationships, forcing customers to navigate multiple sales contacts for similar product categories. The move also allows Xerox to present a unified portfolio story rather than maintaining artificial distinctions between legacy Xerox and Lexmark product lines. However, integration alone does not create competitive advantage; it merely removes self-inflicted operational drag that naturally occurs with any major acquisition.
Geographic Tiering Prioritizes Profitability Over Growth Ambition
The restructuring also introduces a two-tier approach to international markets, with Asia Pacific receiving dedicated growth investment while other geographies operate under a cost-efficient hybrid model designed to protect profitability rather than pursue aggressive expansion. This geographic segmentation reflects a pragmatic assessment of where Xerox can realistically compete for share gains versus where it must optimize for margin preservation in lower-priority markets. Asia Pacific’s designation as a growth region aligns with broader market dynamics, where digital transformation spending remains robust and print infrastructure refresh cycles continue to present opportunities, particularly in production print and graphic communications. In contrast, the International Operations unit covering remaining geographies will likely operate with leaner teams, greater reliance on distributors, and selective account focus that avoids unprofitable coverage models. This tiering strategy is financially rational but signals that Xerox is conceding competitive ground in markets where it lacks the resources or strategic rationale to sustain full-scale operations.
Partner Expansion Confronts Channel Disinterest in Print
The decision to shift SMB hardware fulfillment and coverage to partners represents a clear acknowledgment that direct sales models for lower-revenue accounts are no longer sustainable in a challenging print market, but it also exposes a fundamental channel economics problem that Xerox cannot reorganize away. According to the latest Futurum Partner Survey of 400 partners, only 12% are active in selling printing technology, down from 14% in 2025, and only 16% of those partners expect print to be a growth driver for them in 2026. This data reveals that print has become an increasingly niche market, with only specialists and broadline partners remaining active, and even for those participants, it is not expected to be a significant revenue catalyst. For Xerox, this means the company is increasing its reliance on partners at a time when channel interest in print is contracting, creating a structural mismatch between its go-to-market strategy and partners’ willingness to invest in print sales capacity. Partners bring lower-cost coverage, local market presence, and broader product portfolios that include non-Xerox solutions, making them better suited to serve price-sensitive SMB buyers who prioritize convenience and multi-vendor support over brand loyalty. However, if partners view print as a declining category unworthy of sales focus, Xerox risks offloading SMB coverage to partners who lack the motivation to prioritize Xerox products, resulting in reduced market visibility, slower deal velocity, and further share erosion in segments the company can no longer afford to serve directly.
Structural Reorganization Cannot Substitute for Product Differentiation
The restructured go-to-market model improves operational efficiency and aligns sales resources with account economics, but it does not address the fundamental challenge facing Xerox: the need for differentiated product value in a commoditizing print hardware market. Sales reorganization can optimize how products reach customers, but it cannot compensate for undifferentiated offerings, weak innovation pipelines, or competitive disadvantages in pricing, performance, or feature sets. Xerox’s ability to reclaim market share depends on whether its refreshed production print portfolio, IT solutions capabilities, and graphic communications offerings deliver measurable advantages over competitors such as HP, Canon, Ricoh, and Konica Minolta, all of whom have also restructured their go-to-market models and expanded partner ecosystems. The real test will be whether Xerox can translate operational efficiency gains into reinvestment in innovation, customer success, and market-facing capabilities that drive share recapture rather than margin protection.
You can read the full press release at Xerox’s website.
Disclosure: Futurum is a research and advisory firm that engages or has engaged in research, analysis, and advisory services with many technology companies, including those mentioned in this article. The author does not hold any equity positions with any company mentioned in this article.
Analysis and opinions expressed herein are specific to the analyst individually and data and other information that might have been provided for validation, not those of Futurum as a whole.
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Author Information
Alex is Vice President & Practice Lead, Ecosystems, Channels, & Marketplaces at the Futurum Group. He is responsible for establishing and maintaining the Channels Research program as part of the overall Futurum GTM and Channels Practice. This includes overseeing the channel data rollout in the Futurum Intelligence Platform, primary research activities such as research boards and surveys, delivering thought-leading research reports, and advising clients on their indirect go-to-market strategies. Alex also supports the overall operations of the Futurum Research Business Unit, including P&L segmentation, sales and marketing alignment, and budget planning.
Prior to joining Futurum, Alex was VP of Channels & Enterprise Research at Canalys where he led a multi-million dollar research organization with more than 20 analysts. He played an integral role in helping the Canalys research organization migrate into Omdia after having been acquired in 2023. He is an accomplished research leader, as well as an expert in indirect go-to-market strategies. He has delivered numerous keynotes at partner-facing conferences.
Alex is based in Portland, Oregon, but has lived in numerous places, including California, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and the UK. He has a Bachelor in Commerce and Finance Major from Dalhousie University, Halifax Canada.
