A comprehensive overview of the ongoing legal dispute between Arm and Qualcomm, focusing on the acquisition of Nuvia by Qualcomm.

Analyst(s): Olivier Blanchard
Publication date: September 19, 2025

It has been nearly a year since litigation between Arm and Qualcomm reached its crescendo, with the Delaware district court mostly ruling in favor of Qualcomm. (I use the term “mostly” because one item in that initial lawsuit regarding Nuvia remains somewhat unresolved, as I will explain in a moment.) Additionally, Qualcomm’s countersuit against Arm is set to serve as Round 2 for the dispute between the two semiconductor IP giants, and we also need to talk a bit about what to expect from it.

Why bring it up now? Three reasons:

1. Qualcomm’s Snapdragon Summit is upon us again, which means that discussions about the status of the case are bound to resurface during and after the event.
2. Round 2 of that litigation is set to begin in March-April 2026, so understanding where it all began, where we are, and what comes next will be important in the coming months.
3. Lastly, because the outcome of the dispute could impact all Arm licensees, not just Qualcomm, the stakes are a lot bigger than may initially meet the eye, making this discussion all the more important.

Summary of last year’s Arm v. Qualcomm Litigation

I have read a lot of trial coverage and found it very interesting, but I hadn’t yet seen a comprehensive recap. Below, I attempt to capture the whole story and share some points that struck me as significant. We learned a lot from this case – about Arm and Qualcomm, information you can’t get anywhere but the trial transcripts. We learned about Arm’s ambitions and plans to launch their own branded chip, where the long-standing relationship with Qualcomm went awry – and why. This is an essential read for others in the industry, as well as analysts and reporters trying to predict what happens next.

At the heart of the legal dispute between Arm and Qualcomm was Qualcomm’s 2021 acquisition of Nuvia, a chip startup founded by former Apple engineers. While Qualcomm is an Arm licensee, Nuvia had license agreements with Arm to design custom CPU cores based on Arm’s architecture.

When Qualcomm began designing new chips that built on IP from Nuvia’s own designs, Arm took the position that Qualcomm had “improperly” leveraged Nuvia’s license and IP without adhering to Nuvia’s alleged contractual requirements for transfer and renegotiation with Arm. This, Arm asserted, threatened its IP rights and licensing-based business model.

Arm’s Theory of the Case

Arm’s case against Qualcomm was built on several key contentions:

1. Nuvia’s License Were Not Transferable Without Consent and Renegotiation: A central argument from Arm is that Nuvia’s specific Architecture License Agreement (ALA) and Technology License Agreement (TLA) were not automatically transferable to Qualcomm upon its acquisition of Nuvia in 2021. Arm asserted that Qualcomm needed to both obtain Arm’s consent and renegotiate its licensing terms in order to use Nuvia’s custom-designed cores. (Arm claimed it attempted to negotiate with Qualcomm for over a year but failed to reach a new agreement.
2. Breach of Licensing Agreements: Arm alleged that, by proceeding to use Nuvia’s designs in its Snapdragon chips (specifically Oryon cores) without a renegotiated license, Qualcomm had breached the terms of Nuvia’s original agreements with Arm. Additionally, Arm argued that Nuvia’s license was limited to specific categories of use cases: Nuvia initially focused on developing server chips, but Qualcomm wanted to expand those designs to PCs and mobile use cases. Arm’s contention was that these use cases would fall under different royalty agreements and violate the terms of their initial agreement with Nuvia.
3. Protection of Intellectual Property (IP) and Business Model: Arm insisted that its primary motivation for the lawsuit was to protect its intellectual property and the integrity of its licensing ecosystem. Under that premise, Arm further argued that allowing Qualcomm to use Nuvia’s designs under potentially more “favorable” terms than Qualcomm’s own existing licenses, let alone without proper permission, would undermine Arm’s business model, which relies on licensing its IP under specific conditions and royalty structures. Arm added that because Nuvia’s royalty rates were different (reportedly higher) than Qualcomm’s existing rates for specific applications, Arm would lose an estimated $50 million in annual revenue if Qualcomm were allowed to proceed.
4. Right to Terminate Licenses and Demand Destruction of IP: As a consequence of Qualcomm’s alleged licensing breaches, Arm asserted its right to terminate the licenses it had granted to Nuvia. Here is where things got a bit out of hand: A central demand from Arm was that Qualcomm completely cease using any technology derived from Nuvia’s IP and destroy it. We’re talking about the destruction of billions of dollars of technology. This included all chip designs derived from Nuvia’s work under those terminated licenses, including Qualcomm’s Oryon cores, central to Qualcomm’s Snapdragon X series and to the next phase of Qualcomm’s automotive stack.
5. Assertion of Rights Over Derivative Designs: Arm also made broader claims regarding its rights over technology derived from its architecture, reaching into custom designs from licensees. This point was obviously contentious, with Arm seemingly arguing that even custom cores built on its ISA remained significantly tied to Arm’s IP and subject to its licensing control. In other words, Arm had the right to control everything built using its ISA. In theory, this could also apply to products made by other Arm licensees, including Apple.
6. Verdict in Favor of Qualcomm: The case went to trial on December 16 and lasted three days. The CEOs of both companies testified at length. Various other executives and experts were called as witnesses by both companies. After deliberating for part of Thursday and most of Friday, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Qualcomm, finding that Qualcomm had not breached any Arm agreement and its products are licensed. The jury could not determine whether Nuvia, which has no assets and is no longer a company, breached its agreement with Arm.
7. Seeking a Retrial on Nuvia’s Breach: Even after the December 2024 jury verdict found that Qualcomm itself did not breach Nuvia’s license (by virtue of Qualcomm’s own licenses covering the work), the jury was deadlocked on whether Nuvia itself had breached its contract with Arm before the acquisition. While this should be a moot point, given that Qualcomm, not Nuvia, was being sued by Arm, Arm signalled its intention to seek a retrial on that specific issue, perhaps aiming to establish that the Nuvia license was already compromised before Qualcomm took over. That latter portion of the case may get retried – we’ll see. The judge ordered the parties to mediate before coming back for more.
   While this feels like a pointless endeavor, Arm could decide that continuing its legal fight against Qualcomm might shore up a broader narrative, but it doesn’t seem like the strongest legal strategy if Arm’s intent is to win. And winning perhaps was never the strategy. During an earnings call shortly after the trial, Arm’s CFO said they never expected to win the lawsuit and that a win was always just upside. I will let the market unpack the wisdom of that strategy.

Primary Remedies Sought by Arm

What was strange from the beginning of this case was Arm’s most prominently reported legal demand: they didn’t want compensation, or monetary damages for past infringement. Instead, Arm sought a far less reasonable set of demands, including the destruction of Nuvia-derived chip designs and any technology that Arm contended had been developed or was being used in breach of Nuvia’s licensing agreements (even after Arm allegedly terminated those licenses). Arm also separately sought an injunction to stop Qualcomm from using, selling, or otherwise commercializing any chips and designs that incorporated the disputed Nuvia technology.

Arm’s consistent overreach (first in its assertion that Qualcomm should abide by Nuvia’s licensing agreement rather than its own, then by demanding that Qualcomm destroy its own custom IP) seems inexplicable. Even if the facts of the case remained what they were, had Arm sought reasonable financial remedies rather than making unreasonable, reckless, and harmful IP annihilation demands, one could argue that the jury might have been more receptive to its theory of the case. By being unnecessarily heavy-armed (no pun intended), Arm may have undermined its own chances of obtaining a positive verdict.

While fair compensation for trademark infringement was also mentioned in Arm’s initial filing, it quickly became a non-issue.

I have to note that while monetary damages weren’t a demand from Arm, a core element of the dispute was nonetheless financial, since it centered on royalty rates. Arm contended that Qualcomm, after acquiring Nuvia, was improperly trying to use Nuvia’s designs under its own, different (and allegedly less lucrative for Arm in this context) licensing terms. It would be fair to infer from this that Nuvia’s licensing agreement involved higher royalty rates and/or different terms for its intended server chip market.

Arm’s position was that Qualcomm should have renegotiated terms and paid appropriate (translation: higher) royalties for the right to use Nuvia’s designs. Estimates mentioned in court documents and reports suggest Arm believed it was missing out on as much as $50 million annually if Qualcomm was allowed to proceed without a new agreement or adherence to what Arm considered the correct licensing terms for Nuvia’s IP.

In other words, Arm’s legal action was (or should have been) fundamentally aimed at securing what it believed was its rightful future revenue stream by preventing Qualcomm from benefiting from Nuvia’s IP without paying the royalties Arm deemed appropriate. Why Arm opted not to make this a central demand in its complaint, opting instead to punish Qualcomm with a complete obliteration of all Nuvia-related IP, will always be inexplicable to me.

Qualcomm’s Theory of the Case

Qualcomm’s arguments in that initial lawsuit, which was primarily focused on Arm’s claims against Qualcomm regarding the Nuvia acquisition, rested on several key themes:

1. Existing Qualcomm Licenses Cover Nuvia Technology: A cornerstone of Qualcomm’s defense was that its own pre-existing, broad Architecture License Agreement (ALA) with Arm adequately addressed the development and use of custom CPU cores derived from the Nuvia acquisition. Qualcomm further argued that once Nuvia had been acquired by Qualcomm, Nuvia’s designs and work could be leveraged under Qualcomm’s existing, comprehensive licensing terms with Arm.
   The December 2024 jury verdict supported this view, finding that Qualcomm had in fact not breached Nuvia’s licensing agreement, and that Qualcomm chips that incorporated Nuvia technology were properly licensed under Qualcomm’s own contract with Arm.
2. Nuvia’s Designs are Custom and Minimally Reliant on Arm’s Core IP: Qualcomm also asserted that the CPU designs developed by Qualcomm subsequent to the Nuvia acquisition were highly custom and largely developed from scratch. Gerard Williams III, a key figure behind Nuvia and Oryon, supported this assertion in his testimony, confirming that Oryon chips contained very little of Arm’s specific core IP. He estimated that percentage amounted to “one percent or less”, essentially countering Arm’s claims that Qualcomm was improperly using Arm technology developed under Nuvia’s specific (and allegedly non-transferable) license.
3. Arm’s Actions are Anti-Competitive and a Breach of Contract: In its lawsuit filed in January of 2025 (and subsequent amended complaints), Qualcomm accused Arm of engaging in anti-competitive practices. Qualcomm claimed that Arm was attempting to unfairly extract higher royalty payments and stifle innovation, particularly as Qualcomm sought to compete more aggressively in markets like PCs and servers with its Nuvia-derived custom cores.
   Qualcomm further alleged that Arm was attempting to change its business model, driven by its parent company SoftBank, to bolster royalty revenues. This, Qualcomm argued, included attempts to impose new pricing models and pressure licensees to “upgrade” to newer Arm ISAs with higher royalties.
4. Arm Breached Its Own Contractual Obligations: Qualcomm alleged that Arm had breached its obligations under its existing license agreements (both ALA and TLA – Technology License Agreement). Specifically, Qualcomm claimed that Arm has deliberately withheld necessary deliverables (technical information, support, etc.) for Qualcomm’s custom Oryon core development, using the excuse that the agreement didn’t cover Nuvia-based technology. Qualcomm also alleged that Arm had failed to offer licenses for its off-the-shelf cores (like Cortex-A720 and Cortex-A520) at commercially reasonable prices, constituting a breach of their TLA.
5. Arm Misrepresented Its Intentions and Undermined Qualcomm’s Business: Qualcomm also accused Arm of misrepresenting its own business intentions during the case. This accusation addresses testimony from Arm’s CEO, Rene Haas, who allegedly stated that Arm had no plans to compete by building or selling its own chips. Qualcomm alleges that Arm is moving in that direction, which would make them a direct competitor. This part of the complaint moves this litigation from the world of contractual disputes to a more explicitly anticompetitive discussion, which could have more widespread repercussions for Arm if Qualcomm’s assertions prove correct.
   Qualcomm further alleges that Arm engaged in a campaign to undermine Qualcomm’s customer relationships by sending letters to its customers, misrepresenting the terms of the Nuvia agreements, and misleadingly implying legal jeopardy for any company using Qualcomm’s Nuvia-derived products. To add insult to injury, Qualcomm alleges that Arm strategically timed a now-withdrawn license cancellation notice to coincide with major Qualcomm product announcements at its annual Snapdragon Summit 2024 in an effort to maximize business harm. While I am not in a position to comment on intent, I can attest to the timing of Arm’s action, as I happened to be attending the summit when these events took place.
6. Arm’s “Unclean Hands”: Following the December 2024 trial, Qualcomm argued that evidence suggested that Arm itself had not only failed to properly safeguard Nuvia’s confidential information after Arm unilaterally canceled Nuvia’s license, but also used Nuvia’s confidential information in its own products. (Under the legal doctrine of “unclean hands,” Qualcomm suggested Arm could not claim Nuvia had breached confidentiality if Arm itself had failed to uphold similar obligations. While this seems trivial, Arm does appear to have made a number of tactical errors here that did nothing to help its already precarious case against Qualcomm.

Broadly, Qualcomm portrayed itself as rightfully innovating and developing largely custom technology under its existing broad licenses with Arm and being unfairly targeted by Arm’s attempts to modify its licensing terms to increase revenue and potentially weaken competition as it considered entering the chip market directly.

Timeline of the case: How it all played out

• September 2019: Nuvia is founded to develop custom Arm-compatible processors.
• August 2020: Nuvia announces its first CPUs, “Phoenix,” based on Arm architecture, having secured Technology License Agreement (TLA) and Architecture License Agreement (ALA) from Arm.
• January 2021: Qualcomm announces its acquisition of Nuvia for $1.4 billion, intending to use Nuvia’s technology across its product portfolio.
• Post-Acquisition (2021): Arm reportedly notifies Qualcomm and Nuvia that Nuvia’s licenses cannot be assigned without Arm’s approval and that Qualcomm cannot use Nuvia’s technology under those licenses without renegotiation. Negotiations ensue.
• February 2022: Arm terminates Nuvia’s licenses effective March 1, 2022, and requests the cessation of use and destruction of Nuvia-developed technology.
• August 2022 (or around this time): Arm files a lawsuit against Qualcomm for breach of contract and trademark infringement related to the Nuvia acquisition and technology.
• Late 2023: Qualcomm begins sampling its new Oryon processor cores (developed with the Nuvia team), which Arm believes are based on disputed Nuvia technology.
• October 2024 (approx.): Reports emerge that Arm issued a 60-day cancellation notice for Qualcomm’s use of the architectural license acquired via Nuvia (this notice was later reportedly withdrawn or its enforcement efforts dropped after the December trial).
• December 2024: The Arm vs. Qualcomm lawsuit regarding the Nuvia license goes to trial in Delaware.
• December 20, 2024: A jury finds that Qualcomm did not breach Nuvia’s licensing agreement and that its chips are properly licensed under Qualcomm’s own agreement with Arm. While the jury is deadlocked on whether Nuvia breached its contract with Arm before the acquisition, the verdict provides significant validation for Qualcomm’s right to use Nuvia-derived technology under its existing licenses. The Judge suggests mediation.
• January 3, 2025: Qualcomm files a new, separate lawsuit against Arm, alleging Arm is withholding deliverables under their ALA and engaging in anti-competitive behavior.
• February 2025: Arm reportedly drops its attempt to terminate Qualcomm’s Architecture License Agreement related to Nuvia.
• April 2025: Qualcomm files a motion to amend its complaint in the new lawsuit against Arm, adding allegations about Arm’s intent to make its own chips and further breaches of license agreements. Arm opposes this amendment.
• Expected Trial for New Lawsuit: The trial for the case initiated by Qualcomm in January 2025 is anticipated around March or April 2026.

Current Status (as of now):

• December 2024 Trial Verdict: The jury in Delaware mostly sided with Qualcomm, finding that Qualcomm had not breached Nuvia’s chip architecture licensing agreement with Arm, and that its chips, which incorporate elements of Nuvia technology, were indeed properly licensed under Qualcomm’s own existing agreements with Arm.
  This represented a critical victory for Qualcomm, allowing the company to continue developing and selling its Snapdragon X series chips with Oryon cores, and expanding Oryon to other market segments, most notably Automotive.
  The jury was deadlocked on whether Nuvia had breached its original agreement with Arm before the acquisition, but again, this point seems moot as Nuvia was not a party to the dispute.
• Post-Trial Maneuvering: Following the December 2024 trial, Arm signalled that it might seek a retrial on the deadlocked issue. The judge presiding over the case ordered mandatory mediation between the parties, expressing her disapproval of the case as a whole, and hoping that both companies would find a way forward without wasting the court’s time. Arm subsequently ended its attempt to terminate Qualcomm’s Architecture License Agreement (ALA) acquired through Nuvia.
• Qualcomm Files New Lawsuit (January 2025): In January 2025, immediately following the verdict, Qualcomm filed a new, separate lawsuit against Arm. The new suit alleges that Arm withheld deliverables (technical information and support) that Qualcomm was entitled to under its ALA, specifically for its Nuvia-based custom core designs. Qualcomm also accuses Arm of misrepresenting facts about the earlier case to customers, engaging in anti-competitive practices, and obstructing Qualcomm’s business.
• Qualcomm Amends Complaint (April 2025): Qualcomm sought to amend its complaint in the new lawsuit, adding a new set of allegations about Arm’s conduct. These include claims that Arm attempted to obstruct Qualcomm’s development of custom cores and misrepresented its intentions. On this point specifically, Qualcomm alleges that Arm is now planning to design and sell its own semiconductor chips, which would make Arm a direct competitor to Qualcomm. Arm has opposed these amendments, citing undue delay and potential prejudice, but if Qualcomm can produce unimpeachable evidence that the accusation holds water, Arm could find itself in a spot of trouble with anticompetition regulators.
  As stated earlier, the new case filed by Qualcomm is expected to go to trial around March or April 2026.

Post-Op Notes, and What To Watch For: I can’t help but wonder how things might have turned out differently if Arm had chosen a different, more reasonable track to resolve this dispute. The facts of the case aside, Arm’s strategy to force Qualcomm to destroy valuable IP and inflict undue harm not only to Qualcomm but also to its ecosystem of partners, rather than focus on arguing for monetary damages, was inexplicably punitive, disproportionate, and counterproductive to a positive outcome. At a minimum, it certainly did nothing to endear the jury to its theory of the case, let alone convince the court that its litigation was filed in good faith.

The judge’s comments at the end of the case indeed suggest that she was not pleased with the manner in which the dispute was handled. This also begs the question: Why did Arm file this lawsuit in the first place? It seemed unlikely that a court would order Qualcomm and its PC customers to destroy technology, so what was happening here?

In addition, Arm also appears to have made a number of unforced errors in the case, like allegedly cancelling Nuvia’s license prematurely, not providing the jury with more reasonable outcome options, allegedly using Nuvia’s confidential information in its own products, and reportedly making knowingly false statements to Qualcomm’s customers.

Perhaps most troubling moving forward are the allegations at the heart of Qualcomm’s countersuit. Looking at Arm’s strategy broadly, what I see here is not only an expensive failure to deliver a win in the initial case, but the opening of a proverbial can of worms regarding both its intent and conduct during the case, and the added exposure of potential worldwide antitrust action. In other words, not only did Arm’s legal team fumble in court and fail to produce a single positive outcome for the company, Arm’s conduct may have also exposed it to regulatory action and a potential PR crisis that could damage its brand and credibility. The European Commission has announced it has opened an investigation into Arm’s alleged anti-competitive conduct.

The entire technology sector fares better when the IP and licensing ecosystem that helps drive innovation is healthy and harmonious. My hope is that Arm and Qualcomm, who have both benefited from each other’s capacity for innovation over the years, will find a way forward that limits unnecessary litigation and avoids negative impacts on the sector at large.

Round 2 is set for March-April 2026. Until then, keep an eye out for further updates from us on this matter.

Disclosure: Futurum is a research and advisory firm that engages or has engaged in research, analysis, and advisory services with many technology companies, including those mentioned in this article. The author does not hold any equity positions with any company mentioned in this article.

Analysis and opinions expressed herein are specific to the analyst individually and data and other information that might have been provided for validation, not those of Futurum as a whole.

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Author Information

Olivier Blanchard

Olivier Blanchard is Research Director, Intelligent Devices. He covers edge semiconductors and intelligent AI-capable devices for Futurum. In addition to having co-authored several books about digital transformation and AI with Futurum Group CEO Daniel Newman, Blanchard brings considerable experience demystifying new and emerging technologies, advising clients on how best to future-proof their organizations, and helping maximize the positive impacts of technology disruption while mitigating their potentially negative effects. Follow his extended analysis on X and LinkedIn.